on seeing and looking at different bodies
- The Ugly Laws: Disability in Public by Susan Schweik
- Changing Faces: The Challenge of Facial Disfigurement by James Partridge
- Staring: How We Look by Rosemarie Garland-Thomson
- Saving Face: Disfigurement and the Politics of Appearance by Heather Laine Talley
- Autobiography of a Face by Lucy Grealy
- Sex and Disability, Robert McRuer and Anna Mollow, eds.
Lots of us see and all of us are seen.
For a while now I’ve wanted to write an essay about books I’ve recently read about the challenges faced by people with bodies that are visibly different. That last bit of course raises the question: different from what?
I use “different” as a catch-all term to distinguish bodies that have some characteristic that’s not normal. Normal is a loaded and strange term I want to be careful with. To the greatest extent I can, I mean to use “normal” descriptively rather than prescriptively in order to examine what it takes to have a body that our society considers unremarkable. I don’t at all mean to endorse existing presumptions about what should be considered normal or abnormal. After all, ultimately almost no one’s body is “normal”:
Goffman (1986) sums up this archetypal “normal” as the “only one complete unblushing male in America: a young, married, white, urban, northern, heterosexual, Protestant father of college education, fully employed, of good complexion, weight and height, and recent record in sports.” The ironic point in this description is that the prototypical figure of normalcy is not what we actually see everywhere but rather what we expect to see . . . Comparisons to what we expect determine our understanding . . . of the disproportionate, the grotesque, deformed, miniature, gigantic, or unusual.
– Staring: How We Look, page 45
Bodies are rendered visibly different through our disgust, our desire, our discomfort, and our disregard. The question of how to ethically engage with everyone we come across in life in all their infinite varieties of bodies is one these books begin to tackle. My essay about those books has been a long time coming. A combination of inertia and my worry that I don’t have anything worthwhile to add has held me back, but now feels like the time when I ought to try to share my thoughts.
Like lots of others, I am in despair about the recent election. It’s a historical moment that’s still incredibly raw. I myself am maybe still not yet much past the point of being flatly stupefied. As I write, we await the swearing in of politicians whose repugnancy is tempered only by the small possibility that they’re perhaps too lax, inattentive, and/or incompetent to implement the frightening platforms they campaigned upon. On election night, seeing the reactions of all the people I love – watching their hearts break in real time on frenetically re-refreshing timelines and newsfeeds – was a singularly terrible moment, capable as it was of making me feel powerless and alone, even as almost everyone I know was, in parallel, simultaneously also feeling powerless and alone. Years of peril lie ahead for now.
But if, as many argue, the personal is political, I want to talk about the powerful ethical agency we wield every day just by looking at others and by how we react to what we see when we look (or don’t). In my search for ways to move forward after a cataclysmically bad election, I believe there are constructive possibilities for social change available to each of us in our daily lives by reflecting on how we see and look at everyone around us.
In describing what’s at stake for people whose bodies are different, labeling the considerations raised by seeing and looking simply as “personal” maybe doesn’t go far enough. Indeed, it wasn’t very long ago at all that you could be arrested for the crime of being perceived as ugly in public:
…municipal enactments of the ugly law ceased by World War I, but the last documented arrest, astonishingly, happened in Omaha, Nebraska, in 1974. An Omaha policeman wanted to arrest a homeless man but had no basis for it. He combed the city code, found the ugly law still on the books, and took the man into custody on the grounds that he had “marks and scars on his body.” Unsurprisingly, the arrest met with confusion and noncooperation by Omaha city prosecutors. “What’s the standard of ugliness?” inquired Judge Walter Cropper, both initiating and responding to a deep conflation of “disease, maiming and deformity” with the word “ugly.” “Who is ugly and who isn’t?” Cropper asked. “Does the law mean that every time my neighbor’s funny-looking kids ask for something I should have them arrested?” Assistant prosecutor Richard Epstein noted that criminal prosecution would require the impossible: courtroom proof that “someone is ugly.”
– The Ugly Laws, page 6.
If being thought ugly no longer subjects one to criminal prosecution, attitudes toward people whose bodies are different due to various disabilities can still today be outrageously malign:
. . . a reader’s letter to Ann Landers, advocating special sections in restaurants “for handicapped people—partially hidden by palms or other greenery so that they are not seen by other guests.” After Landers told off a “Chicago Reader” who complained at the sight of a disabled woman in a restaurant, she printed a raft of hostile letters in response. “Has it occurred to you that . . . it is not their divine right to burden the general public with their problems?” wrote F.Z. from Columbus, Ohio. “Would you believe that there are many handicapped people who take great pleasure in flaunting their disability so they can make able-bodied people feel guilty? I, for one, refuse to fall into that trap,” began a letter from California. “The sight of a woman in a wheelchair with food running down her chin would make me throw up. I believe my rights should be respected as much as the rights of the person in the wheelchair . . . maybe even more so, because I am normal and she is not.”
– The Ugly Laws, page 14.
One need not resort to the active hostility of the letter writer from California in order to stigmatize people with different bodies. Many people without ill-will who are merely uneasy around people with disabilities can in their own way underscore the isolation of those who are visibly different:
In The Body Silent, anthropologist Robert Murphy, who conducted fieldwork on his own experience of quadriplegia, points out that looking away from people who make us feel uncomfortable differs from granting them visual anonymity. Looking away is an active denial of acknowledgement rather than the tacit tipping of one’s hat to ordinary fellow citizens expressed in simply not noticing one another. Looking away is for Murphy a deliberate obliteration of his personhood. “[A] wheelchair cannot be hidden,” he notes, “it is brutally visible.” People refuse to look at Murphy, he concludes, partly because they know they are not supposed to stare at him and have no easy way to relate to him. Having been on both sides of stares, Murphy writes of his own “selective blindness” before becoming disabled, contending that a disabled person entering his “field of vision” would not register in his consciousness. After he began using a wheelchair, however, he saw that sociality between nondisabled and disabled people is “tense, awkward, and problematic” and that this is often expressed through ocular evasion. The newly quadriplegic Murphy found that acquaintances “did not look [his] way” and he was “virtually ignored in crowds for long periods, broken by short bursts of patronization.” This “pattern of avoidance” begets feelings of shame and guilt which initially erode Murphy’s dignity and self-esteem. Murphy’s subtle analysis of the social message that looking and looking away sends to stares suggests that recuperating the dignity lost in such exchanges is a demanding task for people with disabilities.
– Staring: How We Look, page 83.
Difficulties with looking and visible differences don’t just arise among strangers. Our treatment of those we love and care about can also be circumscribed by our inability to look past what we see. James Partridge, who suffered serious injuries to his face, recounted his experience with those who visited him as he began his recovery:
Many visitors will find it hard to look at all; they literally don’t know where, or how, to look; they will fuss with the flowers or look out of the window or talk to others in the room.
– Changing Faces, page 36.
And in devastatingly sad findings, research shows that even parents lavish less love on children with different faces and abuse them more often:
. . . Children with craniofacial anomalies are more likely to be ignored by their parents. Facially variant children are less likely to be held, played with, and looked at by their mothers. Worse yet, research indicates that children with facial difference experience more abuse than children with “normal” faces. Disfigurement structures adulthood, too. For example, people with facial difference are significantly less likely to be hired even when compared to those with other physical disabilities.
– Saving Face, page 16.
All that said, the personal experience of Partridge as he traveled the world suggests what one might already reasonably suspect: that the discomfort and stigma associated with various types of bodily difference are cultural – and what’s cultural might possibly be changed if all of us try:
A few years after my accident, still looking very badly disfigured, I traveled to India. There, and in Iran and Afghanistan, my face was rarely given the slightest attention. Heavily scarred faces are regular sights, as disfiguring diseases and accidents are commonplace, while plastic surgery is not widely available in these countries. I could have quite easily lived and worked there with no further surgery. But on my return, a trip on the London Underground was enough to convince me that I needed more reconstruction to live and work in Britain.
– Changing Faces, pages 49-50.
How Do We Look?
Of course, the broader scale of bodily differences takes in almost all of us – not just people who look strikingly different at first glance due to injury or disability. Both my personal experience and what I’ve read confirm that how you look has a profound effect on how you’re treated. Some people are subject to stares. And some folks are left alone – there are those who are disregarded and ignored, while others are accorded the privilege of gliding effortlessly through the public eye.
Feminist disability scholar Garland-Thomson talks about who is granted the “visual anonymity” that anthropologist Robert Murphy keenly felt he lost when he became bound to a wheelchair. In modern life we are surrounded by a constant swirl of unfamiliar people. In contrast to the explicitly averted gazes and flinty evasion described by Murphy above, society extends to some what Garland-Thomson and others call “civil inattention” – the right not to be openly noticed, to not be stared at:
To recognize, in anything but the most superficial manner, individuals amid the flood of mass-produced strangers we encounter would overwhelm us. The solution is simply not to engage with them, to notice them as little as possible unless necessary, and to surround ourselves with shields of privacy . . . Since we cannot recognize each other fully and deeply as we could with our familiars, we both expect and accord each other what the sociologist Erving Goffman calls “civil inattention.” Getting through our day amid this tangle of others depends on such ocular complacency. Staring at one another interrupts this tacit arrangement by exposing us to what might be called incivil attention . . . To be ordinary is to be normal, properly presentable. Indeed, one of the major liberties accorded to the ordinary is civil inattention—that is, the freedom to be inconspicuous, not to be a staree.
– Staring: How We Look, page 35.
Describing civil inattention as the preserve of “ordinary, properly presentable” folks is a way of observing that the political power that accrues to those perceived as normal serves to insulate those who have it from unwelcome attention from the crowds’ eyes. Being given civil inattention is distinct from being invisible or ignored – the former reflects consideration bestowed, the latter reflects consideration withheld. A homeless person on a street corner is not benefiting from civil inattention. A customer in a shop who is left alone to browse is getting it – and not all people in shops enjoy the privilege of being left alone to browse.
From all accounts, one very straightforward way to forfeit civil inattention and to become the subject of stares is to be a woman. No matter where society places women on the spectrum from ugly to beautiful, their bodies are rigorously scrutinized. Lucy Grealy, a woman who had had intrusive surgery on her face from a young age, recalled returning from a summer break to enter junior high school. While she’d always received cruel taunts from her peers, with the onset of puberty she found herself seen through a lens that had now become sexualized. The results were even more demeaning than before:
The summer passed, and junior high school loomed. Jan, Teresa, and Sarah were all very excited at the prospect of being “grownups,” of attending different classes, of having their own locker. Their excitement was contagious, and the night before the first day of school, I proudly marked my assorted notebooks for my different subjects and secretly scuffled by new shoes to make them look old.
Everyone must have been nervous, but I was sure I was the only one who felt true apprehension. I found myself sidling through halls I’d been looking forward to, trying to pretend that I didn’t notice the other kids, almost all of them strangers from adjoining towns, staring at me. Having seen plenty of teen movies with their promise of intrigue and drama, I had been looking forward to going to the lunchroom. As it happened, I sat down next to a table full of boys.
They pointed openly and laughed, calling out loudly enough for me to hear, “What on earth is that?” “That is the ugliest girl I have ever seen.” I knew in my heart that their comments had nothing to do with me, that it was all about them appearing tough and cool to their friends. But these boys were older than the ones in grade school, and for the very first time I realized they were passing judgment on my suitability, or lack of it, as a girlfriend. “I bet David wants to go kiss her, don’t you, David?” “Yeah, right, then I’ll go kiss your mother’s asshole.” “How’ll you know which is which?”
My initial tactic was to pretend I didn’t hear them, but this only seemed to spur them on. In the hallways, where I suffered similar attacks of teasing from random attackers, I simply looked down at the floor and walked more quickly, but in the lunchroom I was a sitting duck. The same group took to seeking me out and purposely sitting near me day after day, even when I tried to camouflage myself by sitting in the middle of a group. They grew bolder, and I could hear them plotting to send someone to sit across the table from me. I’d look up from my food and there would be a boy slouching awkwardly in a red plastic chair, innocently asking me my name. Then he’d ask me how I got to be so ugly. At this the group would burst into laughter, and my inquisitor would saunter back, victorious.
After two weeks I broke down and went to my guidance counselor to complain. I thought he would offer to reprimand them, but instead he asked if I’d like to come and eat in the privacy of his office. Surprised, I said yes, and that’s what I did for the rest of the year whenever I was attending school…
– Autobiography of a Face, pages 124-125.
To try to be charitable, the guidance counselor surely meant to be kind, but his gesture grievously failed to affirm Lucy Grealy’s human dignity, placing as it did the burden of avoiding stares on her. One would have hoped a responsible adult would have instead braved a moral confrontation with those whose stares were a vehicle for intentional cruelty.
Many readers already well know that women’s bodies don’t need to be abnormal to be the subject of unsolicited attention. In a chapter on breasts, Garland-Thomson offers a fascinating anecdote from someone who has lived on both sides of the male gaze to illustrate how that gaze is influenced both by biology and the power dynamics associated with social position:
…One perspective on anxiety about who should and should not stare at breasts comes from a person who was born intersexed. After living for twenty-four years as a woman, this person transitioned to being a man, an identity with which he felt more comfortable. In addition to comportment and costuming adjustments, testosterone treatments accomplished his transition into manhood. Testosterone provided some of the visible marks of manhood such as facial hair, a more manly body, and a lower voice. Hormonally become a male, much to his surprise, affected his staring behavior. He reports that after taking testosterone for several weeks, he began noticing women’s bodies different from before, when he had mostly only looked at people’s bodies to simply note differences. Now that he is hormonally a man, he says when he first sees women in public he finds that he rarely looks at their faces anymore but begins his visual acquaintance with them by staring at their breasts. Having lived as a woman, he finds it mortifying to have developed what he calls “guy’s eyes” and become a “breast man.” Nonetheless, even when his brain tells him not to stare at breasts, he has difficulty not doing so. Despite his initial resistance, he now says that he accepts and even relishes this stereotypical looking practice as part of everyday life as a man. His new social position as a male, in other words, grants him permission to stare at breasts. Here then, the privileges of proper masculinity override the social proscription against staring.
– Staring: How We Look, page 145.
I don’t argue that characterizing behavior as “natural” or as having a biological basis constitutes a valid ethical defense of that behavior, and neither does Garland-Thomson. Nevertheless, while civil inattention might be granted unconsciously by force of habit or consciously as an ethical choice, an impulse to stare at the unusual or remarkable can be irresistible:
Staring is a universal part of our cognitive architecture that natural selection has bequeathed us. The evolutionary origin of staring is a startle response. When staring is intentional—as in the long loving look or the hostile glare—we are masters of our eyes. When an unexpected sight grabs our attention, however, staring is spontaneous and volatile. As the epigraph to the previous section says, “staring, in its pure and simple essence, is the time required by the brain to make sense of the unexpected.” We cannot, even when we try, ignore compelling visual stimuli; we can only withdraw the stare once it is in play.
– Staring: How We Look, page 17.
The issue of how to ethically engage with people whose bodies are visibly different, then, is still unresolved. If one ought not intentionally look away on the one hand, or stare on the other, what’s left?
An Uncomfortable Question
On the occasions when I have the presence of mind to consider it, there’s a question I ask myself when I’m dealing with someone who is testing my patience, boring me, or frustrating me. Someone might be demanding my time in ways I resent or begrudge; they might be seizing hold of my attention when I’d rather be directing it in many other directions than theirs. I won’t bother trying to pose hypothetical circumstances because encounters like that suffuse everyday life – we all live through them all the time.
The question goes something like this: right now would I be much more solicitous of and attentive to this tiresome person in front of me if they were someone I was really physically attracted to?
When I do take pause to ask myself that, the answer is almost always: yes, I would be.
I have to work on that.
Imperfect Identification
Bodies that are different have their admirers – as discussed above, almost no one’s body conforms entirely to Goffman’s archetypal figure of normalcy, and sexual desire is diverse and all-encompassing. Sex is indeed a very tangible way of engaging with different bodies. When people with different bodies are acknowledged as subjects, as opposed to being reduced down to their bodily differences, they write that sex and sexuality can be powerfully affirming.
But what sort of affirmation, if any, can a person with a different body take from sexual advances if she perceives that her suitors’ desire is inextricable from disgust? Alison Kafer, an amputee, reflected upon being fetishized, as well as the darker implications of others’ negative reactions to her being fetishized:
“Dear Alison,
Because of an overall almost total void of amputee women, when one does show herself, it is a major event. For instance (and please don’t take this personally), if I were to see you unexpectedly, walking down the street, chances are good that it would send me into a state just short of shock – the adrenalin would start to flow, the heart rate would quicken, the palms would start to sweat, etc. This really happens! And, I would, in relishing the moment, do everything UNOBTRUSIVELY possible to savor it. In the past, I’ve turned my car around . . . to have another look. I’ve followed someone around in a store/shopping center (at a safe and non-threatening distance) for a few minutes, stealing quick glimpses now and then . . . I just don’t want you or any of your disabled sisters to perceive people like me, who have a genuine interest in you, as well as your “predicament,” shall we say, and who could provide the love and care you deserve, as a bunch of wolves moving in for the kill. Nothing could be further from the truth! To win the love and trust of a disabled lady by meeting her needs and providing for her in every way possible . . . would be the ultimate! Give us a chance, and you’ll reap the benefits IN SPADES!
A friend and admirer,
‘Steve’”
“Steve” and I have never met; our one-sided relationship consists solely of this e-mail and another like it a week earlier. Lengthy descriptions of one man’s sexual self-understanding, both messages offer a personal account of “devoteeism,” a sexual attraction to disabled people, often amputees. For Steve, this desire for amputees “ebbs and floods [sic], . . . but IT IS ALWAYS THERE,” and he carefully explains the nature of this attraction. Noting that devotees “would infinitely rather go out with an amputee of average looks and build than a gorgeous 4-limbed woman,” Steve encourages me to think kindly of devotees because they “can’t get enough of [my] beautiful looks.” For Steve, my “beautiful looks” are the result of my two above-the-knee amputations; the fact that he knows nothing else about my appearance, or my life in general, does nothing to dampen his desire.
It is a desire that others apparently share: although Steve was among the most articulate and thorough defenders of devoteeism to enter my inbox, he was not alone; over the course of a few years, beginning in September 2000, several other devotees wrote to me about their desire for bodies like mine. Reading those e-mails, I did exactly what Steve had politely asked me not to do: I took them personally. Who were these men tracing me through the internet? Was I one of the women they were following surreptitiously? I became increasingly suspicious of strangers, particularly those interested in learning about my disabilities.
My suspicions were shared, and expanded upon, by my friends and family. “There are people called devotees,” I would explain, “who are sexually attracted to amputees.” Their responses were immediate and unequivocal: “Ewww, that’s weird. What’s wrong with those people?” Although I confess to following this train of thought myself, wondering what was “wrong” with devotees, hearing it expressed with such consistency troubled me. What were my friends and family finding reprehensible—the surreptitiousness of devotee behavior or the desire for disabled bodies? The fact that many of them condemned devoteeism immediately, hearing only the existence of the attraction and not its manifestations, led me to worry that what troubled them was the very casting of disabled bodies as inherently attractive. And if so, where did that leave me? Did my friends and family unconsciously find my body so freakish that anyone attracted to it was immediately suspect? Did I share their derisive attitudes? What would it say about my self-image if I dismissed as disgusting and suspicious anyone who desired me? On the other hand, what would it say about my self-image if I were so desperate for sexual recognition that I accepted the kind of behavior mentioned in Steve’s e-mail? Were these two choices my only options? Was devotee desire the only desire available to me?
– Sex and Disability, pages 331-33.
“Steve” here is located in what akin to something like an uncanny valley of identification with Kafer as a subject – close enough to actually being empathetic that he virtually begs forgiveness for his obsession and stresses that he wants to be unobtrusive and non-threatening in his desire – insisting that his heart is true – but it’s those over the top attempts to demonstrate the purity of his desire that end up emphasizing the yawning canyon of understanding which actually separates him from Kafer.
Perhaps in reaction to Steve’s assertion that he “would infinitely rather go out with an amputee of average looks and build than a gorgeous 4-limbed woman,” Kafer writes:
…the rhetoric of devoteeism relies as heavily on disgust for disabled bodies as it does desire. Devotees typically define themselves not simply as people sexually attracted to amputees but as the only people sexually attracted to amputees. “Unlike everyone else,” they claim, “we find you not disgusting but desirable.”
– Sex and Disability, page 335.
One unfortunately common theme among the accounts of people with different bodies is the effort involved in perpetually doing the emotional work necessary to manage others’ discomfort around them. The grace on display is little short of extraordinary, as in this passage where James Partridge gives his take on how to accommodate the sympathy pains of others:
. . . where their anguish makes them freeze up, you must understand their difficulty: they don’t want you to see how sad they are for you, for fear that you will feel even worse. But you can see it in their eyes. They are mourning for you, for what you’ve lost, but they are afraid to cry or say how sorry they are. The temptation in such circumstances is to state the simple ‘I’m OK’ line and hope that this reassurance will be sufficient to let their anguish subside to tolerable, less immediate levels and allow them to act normally toward you. Sometimes this works, occasionally with a passing remark from them like, ‘Oh, you are so brave.’ When they come to terms with you and converse without inhibition, your ‘I’m OK’ statement may need some elaboration. Unfortunately, the anguished tend to take the ‘I’m OK’ reassurance as just a valiant effort on your part to put a brave face on it, and they just don’t believe that you can ever possibly be OK again. If anything, their anguish deepens. What they need is to be able to believe by your actions that you don’t feel bitter or resentful of your lot. If you can genuinely show this, their anguish will be dissipated, because they will realize you don’t want or need sympathy.
– Changing Faces, page 92.
I recall when I was in elementary school my class went on a trip to a nature center. A naturalist there was giving a presentation about the center, and apropos of nothing I raised my hand and asked her what had happened to her. If she was sick and tired of answering that question – and who could blame her if she were – she hid it well, because she told me patiently and matter-of-factly that she had lost her arm in a motorcycle accident.
There are various ploys that can be quite effective at deterring staring if you are unhappy with it. You can make direct but unmalicious eye-to-eye contact, indicating that you are quite capable of looking straight at them and have nothing to hide. Or again, staring can be met by joining conversation – pick a subject on which you think the onlookers will have some strong opinions and be interested in their answers. Before you know it, they will have forgotten their staring and be immersed in telling their stories. You will have to keep up the conversation until you judge it right to help them ask the big question: ‘What happened to you?’
– Changing Faces, page 89.
Her Modest Offering
I hope you found the passages I’ve highlighted here in this essay as thought provoking as I did, and I also hope my comments have served to meaningfully build upon them. All the texts I’ve excerpted are worth reading in their entirety and the insights contained within those books go well beyond what I’ve covered here.
As I wrap up my thoughts on those works, I don’t think I’ve yet done an adequate job of formulating something like a comprehensive vision (no pun intended) of ethically seeing and looking at bodies that are different.
I’ll leave the final word on that subject to Garland-Thomson, as she describes what Harriet McBryde Johnson had to offer to the world:
Many starees we have considered find themselves in the uncomfortable position in a staring encounter of being someone’s idea of what Sontag calls a “repulsive attraction.” As we have seen, they have developed in response a range of strategies for directing staring interactions. The late disability rights lawyer, activist, and storyteller Harriet McBryde Johnson used media and public appearances to coach the public eye to see her distinctiveness according to her own story rather than the one they may have learned about people who look like her.
“It’s not that I’m ugly,” Johnson begins in the February 16, 2003, cover story of the New York Times Magazine, “It’s more that most people don’t understand how to look at me.” With this edgy, yet understated flourish, Johnson begins a story of looking that illustrates how an ethics of staring might work. The photograph of Johnson on the cover shows her seated in her wheelchair, a surprising pose for a cover girl. Boldly beneath her picture sits the unsettling question that Johnson herself poses for many readers: “Should I Have Been Killed at Birth?” The inexplicable combination of this picture, this venue, and this question is startling. With the New York Times as her stage, Johnson gathers up starers and proceeds to show them “how to look.”
The sight of me is routinely discombobulating. The power wheelchair is enough to inspire gawking, but that’s the least of it. Much more impressive is the impact on my body of more than four decades of a muscle-wasting disease. At this stage of my life, I’m Karen Carpenter thin, flesh mostly vanished, a jumble of bones in a floppy bag of skin. At 15, I threw away the back brace and let my spine reshape itself into a deep twisty S-curve. Now my right side is two deep canyons. To keep myself upright, I lean forward, rest my rib cage on my lap, plant my elbows beside my knees. Since my backbone found its own natural shape, I’ve been entirely comfortable in my skin.
In this description, Johnson takes charge of the staring encounter that began with her cover photo. She accounts for her unusual body, casually, even chirpily, letting us known what “happened” to her. The seeming contradiction between “four decades of a muscle-wasting disease” and the fact that she is “entirely comfortable in [her own] skin” already disturbs our shared understandings of what it means to inhabit a body. Her compelling what-happened-to-you story makes what most of us would consider harrowing into an ordinary experience:
I am in the first generation to survive to such decrepitude. Because antibiotics were available, we didn’t die from the childhood pneumonias that often come with weakened respiratory systems. I guess it is natural enough that most people don’t know what to make of us . . . Two or three times in my life . . . I have been looked at as a rare kind of beauty . . . some people call me Good Luck Lady.
In this passage, Johnson continues to undermine complacent understandings by advancing yet another set of contradictions. Following the unlikely partnership of “disease” and “comfortable,” comes “decrepitude” and “beauty.” This “beauty,” however, is not ordinary but “rare” in several ways. First, it is a beauty seldom recognized, only “two or three times in [her] life.” Second, it is fragile and infrequent; she is one of the few survivors, not only of “childhood pneumonia” but potentially from the threat of being “killed at birth.” Finally, this “rare beauty,” this not-ugly, is distinct from typical beauty; it has a form and logic of its own, much like the unconventional beauty Doug Auld’s portraits of burn survivors presents.
In showing us how to look at her, Johnson retells our shared story about beauty. This is a novel beauty made of an elegant “twisty S-curve,” of “deep canyons” in unexpected places. Hers is a baroque beauty: irregular, exaggerated, and peculiar. Such “rare beauty” is hard to see, both difficult to look at and to appreciate. Like Sontag’s pictures of pain, it is hard not to read Johnson’s looks as an image of suffering or an occasion for pity or horror. Johnson’s picture is hard to see as well because most of us lack the skills to properly appreciate the way she looks without her guidance. If we learn from her how to look, we may come away knowing how to recognize “rare beauty” when we see it again. If Johnson’s story succeeds, the wide audience of The New York Times may be moved toward a kind of conservation campaign to value and save from extinction the “rare beauty” Johnson has showed them how to appreciate.
The possibilities for misrecognition, of seeing “ugly” where there is “beauty,” are perpetual. When strangers catch sight of her, “most often” she reports, “the reactions are decidedly negative”:
Strangers on the street are moved to comment:
I admire you for being out; most people would give up.
God bless you! I’ll pray for you.
You don’t let the pain hold you back, do you?
If I had to live like you, I think I’d kill myself.
What people usually see, Johnson suggests, is unbearable pain, insurmountable adversity, a diminished life, and a fervent desire for a cured body. Johnson’s starers bring with them these usual kinds of stories when they encounter the unusual sight of someone like her. Similarly to the way she showed her starers how to look at her, she proceeds next to show them how to imagine her life:
I used to try to explain that in fact I enjoy my life, that it’s a great sensual pleasure to zoom by power chair on these delicious muggy streets, that I have no more reason to kill myself than most people. But it gets tedious. . . . they don’t want to know. They think they know everything there is to know, just by looking at me. That’s how stereotypes work. They don’t know they’re confused, that they’re really expressing the discombobulation that comes in my wake.
What makes people who see Johnson “confused” and “discombobulated” is perhaps not so much how she looks but instead how she ended up on the cover of the New York Times Magazine rather than on a telethon, a medical textbook, or begging on the street corner. How could she say, “I enjoy my life”? This is not a life most people would claim to enjoy. Johnson has the kind of body and the kind of life that people have learned is a sentence of suffering. She is the kind of person that genetic or prenatal tests screen out for elimination, whose feeding tube gets removed, or mostly who no one wants to become. And yet, with a closer look at her picture, you see fondly plaited long hair in a lovely, dark rope that winds across her slender shoulder. She wears those chic Chinese Mary Janes on feet that will never touch pavement. She is dressed in a flowing, gypsy outfit that hints at an artistic, sensual soul. She looks pretty hip, in her own way. This shot, upon closer look, feels much like the usual fashionable photos on the cover of magazines. In fact, with help from her story, a scene may begin to emerge of her enjoying “great sensual pleasure” zooning around “delicious muggy streets.” The power wheelchair in which she seems so comfortably settled perhaps enables rather than confines. Maybe she does not have any reason to kill herself, after all.
Johnson’s tutorial on looking is no etiquette lesson about not staring at people with disabilities. Instead, she puts forward an invitation to stare and skillfully crafts its effect, much like other stares we have seen in this book who with great skill show their starers how to look at them. By confronting the readers of the New York Times with what they have learned to see as an unlivable life, she tells the story of a livable life—indeed, an enjoyable life of rare beauty. She moves her audience from what they do not expect to see to perhaps expecting to see people like her again. In other words, she gets them accustomed to looking at her by making herself more familiar than strange, by bringing her life story closer to their own. By getting them to see her as unremarkable in her distinctiveness, she makes it possible to identify with her own aliveness, which as she tells it, seems pretty much like theirs. By both showing and telling her experience as if were ordinary, Johnson reaches toward the work of Scarry’s beauty and Sontag’s good staring. If Johnson’s approach succeeds, the staring encounter she stages will shift her audience from curiosity to knowledge. She will turn them away from arrested stares and set them on a path toward empathetic identification. To use Sontag’s and Scarry’s terms, she will rescue them from the “repulsive attraction” of bad staring and offer them an opportunity to enact social justice.
By staging strategic staring encounters that teach her audience a new way to look at her, she enables them to recognize her full humanity, to stare without stigmatizing. Understanding that people with stareable bodies can have livable lives contributes to a larger ethical goal of accepting and accommodating devalued human differences. Intolerance for human variation, Michael Ignatieff argues, is an unintended consequence of the “liberal experiment,” which fostered sameness as a measure of equality. To counter this intolerance Ignatieff calls for “a polity based on equal rights with the full incorporation of all available human differences.” By putting forward what in political terms might be termed her minority embodiment, Johnson asks for recognition of her “differences,” her rareness, as distinctive beauty rather than damning deviation. By looking at her closely, they can know her life as she knows it, not as they have learned to imagine it. In showing her audiences that she is not really “ugly,” she undertakes the social justice work of “beauty,“ so that they might recognize “the newness of the entire world.” This is her modest offering, then, to making ours a more equitable and inclusive world.
– Staring: How We Look, pages 188-93.